{"id":834,"date":"2022-01-21T20:29:38","date_gmt":"2022-01-22T03:29:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/?p=834"},"modified":"2022-01-21T20:29:41","modified_gmt":"2022-01-22T03:29:41","slug":"the-application-mandate-that-could-have-serious-security-consequences","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/2022\/01\/21\/the-application-mandate-that-could-have-serious-security-consequences\/","title":{"rendered":"The Application Mandate That Could Have Serious Security Consequences"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter\"><img decoding=\"async\" data-src=\"https:\/\/is4-ssl.mzstatic.com\/image\/thumb\/Purple116\/v4\/bf\/e8\/06\/bfe8068e-a2df-793c-ab1a-13f660ad699e\/AppIcon-1x_U007emarketing-0-5-0-0-P3-85-220.png\/1200x630wa.png\" alt=\"MY2022 on the App Store\" src=\"data:image\/svg+xml;base64,PHN2ZyB3aWR0aD0iMSIgaGVpZ2h0PSIxIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciPjwvc3ZnPg==\" class=\"lazyload\" \/><figcaption><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the low chance that you were considering attending the Beijing 2022 Olympics, you may want to reconsider. The reason: MY2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What is MY2022?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">MY2022 is a smartphone application that is mandatory to use for all attendees of the Beijing 2022 Olympics, including press members, government agents, and athletes. While there currently does not exist proof that the application was designed for malicious purposes, it at the very least has major internal security flaws that can easily be exploited by adversaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter\"><img decoding=\"async\" data-src=\"https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/image3.png\" alt=\"\" src=\"data:image\/svg+xml;base64,PHN2ZyB3aWR0aD0iMSIgaGVpZ2h0PSIxIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciPjwvc3ZnPg==\" class=\"lazyload\" \/><figcaption>Screenshots of the MY2022 user interface <sup>[2]<\/sup><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The research laboratory \u201cCitizen Lab\u201d has done research on this application and, upon multiple discoveries, have pinpointed two major vulnerabilities.<sup>[3]<\/sup> This research was published on January 18th 2022. The result of these vulnerabilities could be potential data leakage of users of the app and spoofing of actual data transmitted through the application\u2019s servers. Citizen Lab has even speculated that these vulnerabilities could have been purposely placed, as an act of surveillance by the Chinese government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Vulnerabilities<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The main vulnerabilities are related to how MY2022 transmits user data. Applications will commonly use SSL, which is used to encrypt and digitally sign data to prevent data from being modified or read when being transmitted between client and server. However, MY2022 does not validate SSL certificates, and thus cannot know if it is sending data to the correct client or server.<sup>[3]<\/sup> This is a concern considering such data could include sensitive information which could be read by an attacker, or data sent from the app could be intercepted and modified by an attacker. One way an attacker can exploit this is by \u201cspoofing\u201d a trusted server of the application, which will allow them to be able to send fake information to clients. At the very least, Citizen Lab found five vulnerable SSL connections that could be exploited on the app:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><code>my2022.beijing2022.cn<\/code><\/li><li><code>tmail.beijing2022.cn<\/code><\/li><li><code>dongaoserver.beijing2022.cn<\/code><\/li><li><code>app.bcia.com.cn<\/code><\/li><li><code>health.customsapp.com<\/code><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Citizen Lab notes in particular that, by spoofing the SSL certificate for <code>health.customapp.com<\/code>, an adversary could be able to acquire travel, passport, or medical information of victims.<sup>[3]<\/sup> Spoofing other servers could also allow for an adversary to read voice audio or file attachments of the victims. Furthermore, some sensitive data on the app is not encrypted at all when transmitted, and an eavesdropper could intercept such data in it\u2019s plaintext form.<sup>[3]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter\"><img decoding=\"async\" data-src=\"https:\/\/www.imperva.com\/learn\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/13\/2017\/09\/man-in-the-middle-mitm-attack.png.webp\" alt=\"man in the middle mitm attack\" src=\"data:image\/svg+xml;base64,PHN2ZyB3aWR0aD0iMSIgaGVpZ2h0PSIxIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciPjwvc3ZnPg==\" class=\"lazyload\" \/><figcaption>Without SSL certificate validation, a &#8220;man in the middle&#8221; attack can occur where the attacker intercepts traffic from the user and the application <sup>[4]<\/sup><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Aftermath?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While the data for this was disclosed to the Beijing Organizing Committee by December 3, 2021, Citizen Lab has not received a response as of January 18 2022.<sup>[3]<\/sup> The application has been recently updated on the Apple App Store, however this update has not fixed any of the vulnerabilities that were reported.<sup>[3]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a word of caution, note that the same vulnerabilities in MY2022 are still possible for any application you install on your smartphone that involves connecting to a server. Since these application are closed-source, we cannot confirm that certain vulnerabilities such as non-existent encryption are not present. Unfortunately, since we cannot be sure as to how these sorts of applications operate at the micro level, the main advice I can give is be extra careful of what you install on your phone. If these sort of privacy vulnerabilities are shocking for you, I would recommend looking into how to root your smartphone to be able to take more control over it by being able to uninstall proprietary software and disable intrusive services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[1] \u201cMY2022.\u201d <em>App\u00a0Store<\/em>, 22 Mar. 2021, https:\/\/apps.apple.com\/nz\/app\/my2022\/id1548453616.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[2] \u201cFigure 1: MY2022\u2019s Splash Screen and Basic UI.\u201d <em>The Citizen Lab<\/em>, https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/image3.png.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[3] Knockel, Jeffrey. \u201cCross-Country Exposure: Analysis of the MY2022 Olympics App.\u201d <em>The Citizen Lab<\/em>, 18 Jan. 2022, https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/2022\/01\/cross-country-exposure-analysis-my2022-olympics-app\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[4] \u201cMan in the Middle Attack Example.\u201d <em>Imperva<\/em>, https:\/\/www.imperva.com\/learn\/application-security\/man-in-the-middle-attack-mitm\/.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>At the low chance that you were considering attending the Beijing 2022 Olympics, you may want to reconsider. The reason: MY2022. What is MY2022? MY2022 is a smartphone application that is mandatory to use for all attendees of the Beijing 2022 Olympics, including press members, government agents, and athletes. While there currently does not exist &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/2022\/01\/21\/the-application-mandate-that-could-have-serious-security-consequences\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;The Application Mandate That Could Have Serious Security Consequences&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":386,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-834","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cpsc-329-602-w22","entry"],"featured_image_src":null,"featured_image_src_square":null,"author_info":{"display_name":"Benjamin Raymond","author_link":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/author\/benjamin-raymond\/"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/834","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/386"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=834"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/834\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":835,"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/834\/revisions\/835"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=834"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=834"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wpsites.ucalgary.ca\/isec-601-f21\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=834"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}